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RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN IQ TESTING-
LARRY P. v. RILES
The decade of the seventies was marked by increasing judicial attacks
upon the concept of "tracking," a method of grouping students according to
their ability and achievement in public educational systems.1  Several
courts 2 have held that the placing of disproportionate numbers of poor and
minority students in low track classes violates the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 3 These cases of the seventies were anticipated as
early as 1967 by the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia in Hobson v. Hansen.4  The Hobson court found the Washington, D.C.
school district's tracking system discriminatory because it placed a dispropor-
tionate number of black children in a low track providing only basic occupa-
1. Subsequent to the writing of this Note, a decision-Parents in Action on Special Edu-
cation v. Chicago Board of Education, No. 74-C-3586 (N.D. 111. July 8, 1980)-in conflict with
Larry P. v. Riles, No. C-71-2270 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979), focused on the issues in Larry P.
discussed herein. After a detailed item by item analysis of the tests in question, Judge John F.
Grady found only one item on the Stanford-Binet and eight items on the WISC and WISC-R to
be "culturally biased against black children." Id. at 115. Accordingly, he held that when these
tests are used in conjunction with other assessment criteria, they do not discriminate unlawfully
against black children. See note 108 infra.
2. See Panitch v. Wisconsin, 444 F.Supp. 320 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (ordering that the class of
all handicapped children in the state of Wisconsin be given at public expense an education
meeting their needs which is equivalent to the education provided nonhandicapped children);
Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that no children eligible for a
publicly supported education in the District of Columbia may be excluded from regular school
classes unless they are allowed an adequate alternative education and a constitutionally adequate
prior hearing with periodic review as to their status, progress and the adequacy of their alterna-
tive education); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (requiring the state not to exclude the class of mentally retarded from public
education and training without a prior hearing).
3. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall ...deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968). The plaintiffs
in Hansen complained that the defendants, the Superintendent of Schools and the Board of
Education of the District of Columbia, deprived not only black children but also poor children
of all races of their right to an equal educational opportunity. Id. at 406. Hansen emphasized
the socio-economic basis of this discrimination to a much greater extent than did Larry P. v.
Riles, No. C-71-2270 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979).
Judge Wright's order in Hansen abolishing the track system of the District of Columbia's
schools was based heavily upon perceived unequal educational opportunities created by the use
of IQ and aptitude tests. 269 F. Supp. at 443-92. The track system was instituted after Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), held that the District of Columbia public school system was
racially segregated in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The sub-
sequent abolition of the District's dual school system resegregated the races by tending to place
more black children in the lower tracks and fewer in the white "honors" track. With respect to
the claim of inequality of education in the district, the Hansen court concluded: "[A]II of the
evidence tends to show that the Washington school system is a monument to the cynicism of
the power structure which governs the voteless capital of the greatest country on earth." 269 F.
Supp. at 407.
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tional education with few remedial opportunities. More recently, in Lora v.
Board of Education,5 a federal district court declared that the placement of
an excessiye number of minority students in special day schools for the emo-
tionally handicapped, a process that isolated minority children from white
children in regular public schools, constituted a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause. 6 The policy underlying these two decisions is to encourage
mainstreaming, an educational concept under which at least part of a child's
school day must be spent in a regular classroom. 7 Congress endorsed
mainstreaming in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 8 and in
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 9
The judicial activity of the 1970's in this area culminated in October of
1979 when the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued its decision in Larry P. v. Riles. 10 In the action against
5. 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). In the introduction to its opinion the court noted
the critical nature of the issues before it, stating that 'the dispute ... is one of the most
excruciating issues of our democratic society." Id. at 1214. The court felt that many children
born into socio-economically and psychologically deprived backgrounds do not have equal op-
portunity to develop their talents and that our society depends primarily upon education to
afford this opportunity-and primarily upon public education, "the great equalizer." Lora con-
cluded that education cannot be the panacea for society's ills:
But the system is-and perhaps by its nature must be-inadequate to lift fully the
burden of poverty, of discrimination and of ignorance that so many of our children
carry.
Hope for substantial improvements lies not in the courts but in the hands of
those who control society's resources and of those who are trained and dedicated to
use pedagogic and therapeutic arts.
Id. Upon reading the opinion, one is struck by the sympathy expressed for the educators in-
volved, a mood which is markedly absent in Larry P. See Condas, Personal Reflections on the
Larry P. Trial and Its Aftermath, 9 SCH. PSYCH. REV. 154 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Condas]
6. 456 F. Supp. at 1276.
7. The court in Lora described mainstreaming as
-providing the most appropriate education for each child in the least restrictive
setting.
-Looking for and creating alternatives that will help general educators serve chil-
dren with learning or adjustment problems in the regular setting. Some approaches
being used to help achieve this are consulting teachers, methods and materials
specialists, itinerant teachers, and resource room teachers ...
Id. at 1265.
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1401, 1405, 1406, 1411-1420, 1453 (1976). See note 39 infra.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). See note 38 infra.
10. No. C-71-2270 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979). Larry P. and the class of black children in
California "who have been or in the future will be wrongly placed and maintained in special
classes for the 'educable mentally retarded' (EMR)" were the plaintiffs in the case. Id. at 3. The
defendants included Wilson Riles, Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of Califor-
nia, members of the California State Board of Education, Robert Alioto, Superintendent of
Schools for the San Francisco Unified School District, and the members of the local board of
education. Id. at 4, 5. Hispanic plaintiffs had brought an action with claims similar to those in
Larry P. in the same court. This suit was settled by a stipulated agreement. Diana v. Board of
Education, No. C-70-37 RFP (N.D. Cal. June 18, 1973).
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Wilson Riles, Superintendent of Education for the State of California, the
court held for Larry P., a black child assigned to an educable mentally re-
tarded (EMR)11 classroom in the San Francisco Unified School District. The
court found that the school district had not provided Larry P. and similarly
situated students with equal educational opportunities and thus had violated
the equal protection clause. 12 It accepted plaintiffs' arguments that they
were treated unfairly, because standardized individual intelligence (IQ) tests,
primarily used to place them in a "dead-end" special education class, were
designed to evaluate white middle-class students, not black children. 13 In
essence, the court analogized the placement of a disproportionate number of
minority children in EMR classes to the dual school system declared viola-
tive of the fourteenth amendment in Brown v. Board of Education. 14 The
net result was the same: black children were stigmatized by isolation from
white children and by placement in inferior educational settings. While
Larry P. and his fellow plaintiffs were not the first to challenge discrimina-
tory placement procedures for special education, they were the first to suc-
ceed in obtaining a permanent injunction against the use of IQ tests in these
procedures. 15
The Larry P. decision represents an attack on a particular "track," that of
EMR classes, a special education category authorized by the California legis-
lature. 16  Further, it overturned two fundamental assumptions of special
education: that IQ tests may be validly used to assess a black child's mental
ability and that a black child may be placed in an EMR class on the basis of
such test results. 1
7
This Note reviews the rationale for Larry P.'s finding that California's
challenged educational practice violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. It analyzes the court's reasoning in light of other
recent decisions involving charges of racial discrimination in educational and
other public institutions. Finally, the Note explores the impact of Larry P.
on American education and its significance for attorneys practicing in the
educational area.
11. " 'Educable mentally retarded' (E.M.R.) children are defined as incapable, 'because of
retarded intellectual development,' of mastering the skills necessary to advance beyond a mini-
mal educational level." No. C-71-2270 at 1(a) (quoting CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56500 (1978)).
12. Id. at 100.
13. Id. at 103.
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. No. C-71-2270 at 103, 104. The court did indicate that IQ tests could be used if they
were judically approved; however, no guidelines for approval were established.
16. Id. at 4, 5. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1880 (West 1976).
17. No. C-71-2270 at 101. To enjoin IQ tests is to ban not only a way of measuring ability,
but also to ban a way of comparing the degree of similarity between a student's ability and
achievement, a method of discovering significant strengths and weaknesses in a student's learn-
ing pattern (e.g., significant deviations in auditory, visual, or cognitive skills from his or her
overall ability), and, hence, a way of providing objective data which may be used to plan indi-
vidualized programs for the best possible education for these individuals.
1980] LARRY P. 1195
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THE DECISION
To understand the significance and impact of Larry P., it is necessary to
highlight the key issues presented. As noted above, the plaintiffs challenged
the use of IQ tests in the process of placement for EMR classes.' 8  They
charged that the tests contained racial and cultural biases, discriminated
against black children, and resulted in placing them in classes that subjected
them to "stigma, inadequate education, and failure to develop the skills
necessary to productive success in our society." 19 In addition, plaintiffs con-
tended that the gross overrepresentation of black children in EMR classes in
proportion to their numbers in the student population clearly revealed the
racial bias of these IQ tests.20
18. The litigation which culminated in Larry P. began in 1972. In Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F.
Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974), the court issued a preliminary
injunction (limited to the San Francisco Unified School District) against the use of IQ tests in
the placement of EMR children. See Note, Constitutional Law-Limiting the Use of Standar-
dized Intelligence Tests for Ability Grouping in Public Schools, 51 N.C. L. REv. 1564 (1973);
Note, Equal Protection and Intelligence Classification, 26 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1974).
Following the initation of this suit in 1972, the plaintiffs moved to modify the class and the
terms of the preliminary injunction to include all black California school children who have
been or may be classified as mentally retarded on the basis of IQ tests. The court agreed and
filed an order on December 13, 1974 expanding the terms of the injunction. No. C-71-2270 at
6. The injunction restrained both the use of individual standardized intelligence tests that do
not properly account for the cultural background and experience of black children and the
placement of black children into EMR classes based on the results of such tests. Id. In January
1975, the defendants voluntarily imposed a moratorium on the use of IQ testing for EMR
placement of all children in the State of California, regardless of race. Nevertheless, during trial
superintendent Riles testified that the state wished to continue IQ testing. Id. at 30.
Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on January 18, 1977 indicating several statutory
bases for their claims including the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619
(1976), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4. They also
alleged violations of the California Constitution and the California Education Code. No. C-71-
2270 at 7.
On August 8, 1977, the U.S. Department of Justice moved to participate as amicus curiae
claiming that if a disproportionate impact on black children were demonstrated or if IQ tests
were not validated for the purpose for which they were used, then a violation of the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 had occur-
red. The motion was granted on August 19, 1977. Id. The court later granted plaintiffs leave to
file a second amended complaint alleging violations of the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act. Id. at 7.
19. No. C-71-2270 at 1. This notion that children are stigmatized by enrollment in special
education classes was also expressed in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 515 (D.D.C.
1967).
20. The court extensively reviewed the data on the disproportionate number of black chil-
dren in EMR classes. No. C-71-2270 at 19. It found that at the time of the trial only ten
percent of California's general student population was black, and that black children constituted
twenty-five percent of the population enrolled in EMR classes. "In the 20 districts accounting
for 80 percent of the enrollment of black children, black students comprise about 27.5 percent
of the student population and 62 percent of the EMR population." Id. at 23. "These figures in
practice mean that EMR classes are often almost entirely composed of minority students, chiefly
black and Hispanic children. From the 1972-73 academic year until at least 1974-75, a majority
of San Francisco's EMR classes had 80 percent or more minority students." Id. at 23 n. 3 3.
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Addressing the question of the validity of the IQ tests for blacks and the
construction of such tests, the plaintiffs alleged, as a documented and gener-
ally accepted fact, that black children as a group perform less well on IQ
tests than white children. 2 ' The court found the argument that this discrep-
ancy is caused by genetic or socio-economic factors inconclusive. 22  Thus,
Moreover, the testimony of expert witnesses indicated that these excessive enrollments could
not be the result of chance even if it were to be assumed that black children have a higher
incidence of mild mental retardation than white children. Id. at 24.
In addition, the court compared enrollments for EMR classes with enrollments in trainable
mentally retarded (TMR) classes, and found that there was no disproportionate enrollment of
black children in TMR classes. Id. It is difficult to make direct comparisons between EMR and
TMR class enrollments. The child in the EMR class should be distinguished from the TMR
child, or clinically retarded child, who manifests a moderate to profound intellectual deficit
which has "concomitant organic deficits of a neurologic, metabolic, or physiological sort." R.
EDGERTON, MENTAL RETARDATION 3 (1979). The TMR child appears to be born in equal num-
bers among all social classes and ethnic groups. Id. at 4. Therefore, a direct comparison be-
tween the number of black children in EMR and TMR classes cannot be made.
Seeking the reason for the disproportionate number of black children in EMR classes, the
court initially looked to the cause of and measurement of intelligence. A substantial portion of
the 10,000 page transcript is devoted to expert testimony on the issue of testing. No. C-71-2270
at 2. Plaintiffs alleged that it had been documented and generally accepted by professionals that
there was a significant difference in the IQ scores of black and white children on standardized
intelligence tests. Id. at 41. However, the reasons for this disparity are open to a variety of
interpretations by professionals in the field.
21. No. C-71-2270 at 39, 41. As the court stated:
It has generally been known since at least the 1920's that black persons do worse
than white ones on standardized intelligence tests of the kind developed earlier in
the century. The undisputed testimony of experts from both sides of the case dem-
onstrated this disparity graphically .... Black children score, on average, one
standard deviation below white children.
Id. at 39-40.
22. Id. at 43. The reasons for this IQ disparity are not clear, and thus the court pursued the
possible causes in an effort to clarify the performance discrepancy. The court first considered
the argument that heredity is a cause, i.e., that the constituents of intelligence are inherited
and that through natural selection a "gene pool" results which determines inherited capacity.
The conclusion of this argument is that blacks as a group are generally less intelligent than
whites. In Larry P., the court noted that while certain state officials would not rule out the
genetic argument, they were unwilling to base any policies on it. Id.
Socio-economic factors may also explain the lower IQ test scores of blacks. Id. at 44, 45.
Some expert witnesses explained that poor children are at a disadvantage on IQ tests. Id. at 43.
The court, however, raised the question whether such disadvantage leads to mental retardation
and to poorer school and test performance. Id. The court heard testimony that poverty creates a
greater risk of all kinds of disease, including mental retardation, due to inadequate prenatal
care, malnutrition, and poor health care. Recognizing that expert witnesses disagree as to the
effect of malnutrition on intelligence, the court relied on a study discounting the theory that
malnutrition causes significant measurable damage. Id. at 44. The court realized that the whole
issue of nature/nurture is still under study, and therefore did not accept the genetic, socio-
economic, or malnutrition theories of causation. Id. at 44-45. See R. EDGERTON, MENTAL
RETARDATION (1979) (discussion of environmental effect on intelligence); J, HUNT, INTELLI-
GENCE AND EXPERIENCE (1961) (same); Jensen, How Much Can We Boost I.Q. and Scholastic
Achievement?, 39 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (1969) (discussion of the influence of heredity on intelli-
gence). See also Reschly, Psychological Evidence in the Larry P. Opinion: A Case of Right
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the court focused its attention on the state's list of tests 23 which, once
employed, would satisfy a state statutory requirement to administer a verbal
or non-verbal intelligence test before EMR placement. 24 The court indi-
cated that the list was hastily compiled without a careful selection process;
hence, little or no effort was made to control racial bias. 25 After examining
the cognitive and perceptual skills measured by IQ tests and how well or
poorly black children performed on these tests compared to white children,
the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence indicating cultural
bias in the tests themselves. 26
The court next endeavored to interpret that bias. Defendants contended
that IQ tests mirror the culture of the United States and that to live in our
Problem-Wrong Solution?, 9 SCH. PSYCH. REV. 123 (1980) (analysis of the issues in Larry P.).
Other evidence on the psychological effects of low socioeconomic status was either not pre-
sented at trial or was ignored by the court. No. C-71-2270 at 125.
23. The court noted:
This list [compiled in 1969] was divided into two basic tests, one of which had to
be used for E.M.R. placement, and supplemental tests. The basic list included the
Stanford-Binet, and WISC (Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, now super-
ceded by the revised WISC-R), the WAIS (Wechsler Pre-School and Primary Scale
of Intelligence) [sic], the WPPSI (Wechsler Pre-School and Primary Scale of Intelli-
gence), and the Leiter International Performance Scale. The supplemental list in-
cluded (1) Arthor Point Scale of Performance Test, revised from II, (2) Catell Infant
Intelligence Scale, (3) Columbia Mental Maturity Scale, revised edition, (4) Draw-
a-Person (Goodenough), (5) Full Range Picture Vocabulary test, (6) Gessell De-
velopment Schedule, (7) Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test, (8) Merrill-Palmer
Pre-School Performance Test, (9) Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, (10) Raven
Progressive Matrices, (11) Slosson Intelligence Test, and (12) Van Alstyne Picture
Vocabulary Test.
No. C-71-2270 at 1(a) n.3.
24. In 1976 the California legislature for the first time enacted a statutory provision that
required a test from this list be given for EMR placement. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56505 (West
1976). The Larry P. court found fault with the California State Board of Education in large part
because of the method it employed in creating this mandatory list of tests. No. C-71-2270 at
27-28. In the face of rising attacks on the discriminatory EMR placement procedures, the court
felt the Board had grasped too hastily for an objective tool that would be a prime determinant of
placement. Id. Unfortunately, the Board used frequency of use by currently practicing
psychologists as the primary criterion for placing a test on the list; consequently, the court
found the list to be a self-engendering form of discrimination. Id.
25. No. C-71-2270 at 27-28. In fact, the California list contains the most widely used and
researched individual assessment devices available, the Stanford-Binet and Wechsler tests. See
A. JERSILD, CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 374-75 (1960). In the 1960's and 1970's emphasis was placed
on "culture-free" or "culture-fair" ability tests, but recent research shows that the black/white
discrepancy continues to exist using these tests.
26. No. C-71-2270 at 47-48. The court scrutinized one of the most extensively researched
tests available, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, which in 1977 underwent a new
standardization to include black children (after that known as the WISC-R). The court noted,
however, that the changes were insufficient, and that although black children were included in
the norm group and the items were revised to be multi-cultural, the test was still biased be-
cause it did not erradicate the black/white disparity in test results. Studies not mentioned by
the court concluded that the greatest disparity between black and white children on the
WISC-R is due to nonverbal factors. A. JENSEN, BIAS IN MENTAL TESTING (1979), as reported
in the Chicago Tribune, December 3, 1979, § 5, at 2, col. 1.
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culture, one needs certain skills measurable by the IQ test. Those persons
who do not independently succeed belong in a special class, namely EMR,
where they will learn essential skills to "get along" in this culture. 27 The
court characterized this approach as giving up on black children and indi-
cated that from the evidence presented, IQ tests were unacceptably racially
biased. 28
Additional evidence of test bias leading to unequal opportunity centered
around the content and curriculum of the EMR classes, which the court
described as "dead end."2 9 The Larry P. court found substantial evidence to
indicate that, once placed in the EMR track, it was virtually impossible for a
child to leave. 30 Thus, the child would be denied an equal opportunity to
prepare for the adult world.
27. No. C-71-2270 at 50.
28. No. C-71-2270 at 51. One commentator has proposed looking at the situation in a dif-
ferent way. She indicated that children are referred for the possibility of placement into EMR
due to failure in the classroom. In other words, children have demonstrated that they are not
achieving before a referral is ever initiated. She also indicated that IQ testing more frequently
demonstrates that the student has better ability than expected instead of showing that a student
is functioning at an EMR level. Lambert, Legal Challenges to Testing-Larry P. A Case in
Point 2 (1978) (unpublished paper presented at the American Psychological Ass'n Convention in
Toronto, Canada) [hereinafter cited as Lambert].
29. Special education classes had been characterized as "dead end" by the plaintiffs in Hob-
son v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) (discussed at note 4 and accompanying text
supra). One witness stated that the lower levels of the track system were a "straitjacket." Id. at
459. The court perceived that "when a student is placed in a lower track, in a very real sense
his future is being decided for him; the kind of education he gets there shapes his future
progress not only in school but in society in general." Id. at 473. Evaluating the evidence for
the 1963-64 school year, the court observed that less than 10% of high school students in the
lowest track were reassigned upwards. Id. at 461. Statistics are, however, a matter of perspec-
tive. That 15 out of 100 children moved out of EMR placement could be said to demonstrate
the flexibility of the system, but the court agreed with the plaintiffs that it proved the reverse,
i.e., a rigid constraining structure. Id. The court mused on "how a student given a steady diet
of simplified materials can keep up, let alone catch up, with children his own age who are
proceeding in a higher curriculum at a faster pace and with a more complex subject-matter
content." Id. at 470. The objective of the lowest track in essence is to teach less and slower,
rather than to concentrate on stimulating, enriching, and challenging the students to raise
themselves into a higher level. Many special educators, however, argue that a student who
reads on a third grade level must be given materials at that level in order to progress, and will
be exceedingly frustrated in a class where a minimum reading level of ninth grade is required.
30. No. C-71-2270 at 19. In addition, the court indicated that children are usually about
eight to ten years of age when they are placed in EMR, and are not thought to be capable of
learning through the regular curriculum. Academic skills are de-emphasized in favor of social
adjustment and economic usefulness, and "naturally they will tend to fall farther and farther
behind the children in the regular classes." Id. In addition, the court observed that "[t]he
educational goals for the educable mentally retarded are not reading, writing and arithmetic per
se .... Academic skills can be objectives when they are taught with the content of the broader
goal and when they are appropriate skills for the cognitive level of the pupil." Id. at 17 (quoting
a 1974 California handbook "Programs for the Educable Mentally Retarded in California Public
Schools"). It appears, however, that the required individual educational plan, developed by
parents, teachers and other team members, would be the proper instrument to determine
which pupils should receive more academic instruction.
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Although the California Code mandates that a team make placement deci-
sions, several witnesses testified that these teams overemphasized the IQ
score. 3' In addition, the court indicated that measures required by the 1970
Education Code, such as adaptive behavior measures, developmental his-
tories, school achievement measures and cultural background data, were not
uniformly used as primary placement criteria. 32
Of special note was the court's dismissal of a defense based upon Califor-
nia statutory provisions requiring parental permission before a school system
could place a child in an EMR class. 33 The defendants claimed the volun-
tary character of placement rendered any discriminatory effect of the IQ
tests insignificant. 34 The court, however, rejected this defense because
black parents seldom refused to give their consent due to the mystique of
teacher authority and the overwhelming effect of IQ scores. 35
31. To stress the overemphasis on IQ scores, the court included in its opinion the following
testimony of Robert Whiteneck, Director of Special Education of the Sonoma County Office of
Education and Director of Special Education from 1965 to 1975 of the Berkeley Schools:
Q. Despite requirements in the Education Code that factors such as developmental
history, adaptive behavior and medical history be assigned, is it your opinion
that I.Q. tests were the primary determinant in E.M.R. placement?
A. I feel definitely they were the prime determinant.
Q. Can you explain why?
A. There is a magic, I think involved with the I.Q. test that has been trained into
us in our schools of education, whether we be regular educators or special
educators, and I think we seem to see that as some sort of a final, solid piece of
data that we can use to make judgments.
Q. Has it been your judgment that teachers and educators tend to look at the I.Q.
scores as an objective criteria?
A. They do, indeed, and they seem to quote scores and feel that the number has
some sort of very definite magic-determining effect on their decisions.
No. C-71-2270 at 31-32.
32. Id. at 33. Counsel for the defendant, Joanne Condas, stated that the IQ score appeared
frequently not because it was the only data used for placement, but because it was a fiscal
control mechanism used to keep pupils out of costly special programs and to justify reimburse-
ment for those students who qualified. Condas, supra note 5, at 157.
33. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56507(5) (West 1976).
34. No. C-71-2270 at 30. In the words of counsel for the defendant, Joanne Condas, speak-
ing personally, not professionally, about the Larry P. case: "[I]t often seems to take an audience
by surprise to be told that in California the EMR program is an optional one-that this incred-
ible brouhaha involves a program anyone may accept or reject. . . . If one meets the eligibility
criteria, he is entitled to avail himself of the EMR program but he is never required to."
Condas, supra note 5, at 157.
35. No. C-71-2270 at 33(a) n.51. The court in Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), also addressed the issue of the difference of response of black and white
parents to the evaluation process. Id. at 1235. It found non-minority parents more successful in
contesting placement because they were able to more readily afford private consultations and
"had a greater familiarity with, and initiative in using, community resources outside the school
system." Id. Non-minority parents could more readily "avail themselves of public schools at
public expense." Id. at 1256. Also, white parents who wanted to keep their children from the
public schools heavily populated with minority students could, according to the court, more
easily pay for private schooling if public funds were not available. Id. It appears, however, that
again the issue is not strictly one of race, but one of economic condition. One would assume
that poor parents of whatever nationality would experience the same difficulties with the sys-
tem.
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19801 LARRY P. 1201
Thus, the court found that the defendants had utilized IQ tests that were
racially and culturally biased and thereby had discriminated against Larry P.
and the class of plaintiffs. In so doing, the defendants were held to have
violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,36 the Emergency School
Aid Act of 1972, 37 section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,38 and the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. 3 9 The defendants in-
fringed upon these laws, the court stated, by the use of placement
mechanisms that had not been validated for their intended purposes and by
placing a disproportionate number of black children in EMR classes. 40 In
addition, the court held that by tolerating the disproportionate enrollments
and racially biased IQ tests, the Board had violated the state and federal
constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws. 41
Having found these violations, the court ordered the following remedies:
that individual standardized intelligence tests should not be used in Califor-
nia to identify and place black children into EMR classes without prior court
approval; that the defendants monitor and eliminate disproportionate place-
ment of black children in EMR classes in California; and that the defendants
should direct each school district to reevaluate every black child currently
classified as an EMR student, without using an IQ test that the court has not
approved 42
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The plaintiffs contended that the placement of black children into EMR
classes based on the results of IQ tests not standardized for their subculture
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1976). Title VI states that: "No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance." Id.
37. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619 (1978).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 echoes Title VI:
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason
of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
Id.
39. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1401, 1405, 1406, 1411-1420, 1453 (1976). The Act provides pro-
cedural safeguards for programs funded under it including the requirement that procedures be
established that "assure that testing and evaluation materials and procedures utilized for the
purposes of evaluation and placement of handicapped children will be selected and administered
so as not to be racially or culturally discriminatory." Id. at § 1412(5)(C).
40. No. C-71-2270 at 101. Plaintiffs' argument that the use of IQ tests is discriminatory may
receive some support from statistics compiled since the court's 1975 ban on IQ testing. There
has been a 4% drop (from 50% to 46%) in placement of black children in EMR classes in the 20
California school districts with 80% of the black students in the state. Id. at 37. The court found
this evidence statistically significant, thus supporting the inference that the IQ tests have a
discriminatory effect. Id. On the other hand, it might be that other causes are responsible for
this drop, such as a greater awareness of the overrepresentation of minority children in EMR
classes and a resulting reluctance to place them in EMR classes.
41. Id. at 101.
42. Id. at 104-06.
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violated both statutory law and the equal protection clauses of the United
States and the California Constitutions. 43 The court discussed both the fed-
eral statutory and the constitutional claims in some depth but gave less at-
tention to the claims under the California Constitution. 4
Generally, all the federal statutes in question allow a party demonstrating
that an educational system is engaged in a practice having a discriminatory
effect to seek an injunction of such conduct, even though the school system
has no purposeful design to perpetrate such discrimination. 45 Because the
San Francisco school system's placement statistics provided the prima facie
case that a significantly disproportionate number of blacks were placed in
EMR classes, discriminatory effect was readily apparent and virtually impos-
sible to contest under these statutes. 46
Nevertheless, the court in Larry P. did not rest its decision on the federal
statutory claims alone, but rather proceeded to analyze the constitutional
grounds for finding illegal discrimination. Because the statutes under consid-
eration had been enacted only recently and there had been little judicial
interpretation of discrimination under those laws,4 7 the court felt compelled
to examine the claims under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
43. Following the holding of Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the
court rejected the defendants' arguments that plaintiffs cannot enforce their federal statutory
claims because they lack a private right of action under the federal statutes. No. C-71-2270 at
52-55. The defendants further objected that the plaintiffs had not exhausted the administrative
remedies provided by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§
1232, 1401, 1405, 1406, 1411-1420, & 1453 (1976). No. C-71-2270 at 55. The court rejected this
defense, however, because the case was originally brought on the basis of constitutional claims
which do not require the plaintiffs to first pursue relief through administrative channels. Id.
The court reasoned as follows:
Given the close relationship in this litigation of Title VI, section 504, and the
E.H.A. and our finding that the first two do not require exhaustion, it would be
absurd as a practical matter to deny redress under the E.H.A., which took effect on
October 1, 1977 .... [I]n a case based on multiple statutes and charging system-
wide testing and placement biases, we frankly do not see the purpose of individual
exhaustion.
Id. at 56.
44. The plaintiffs also argued that the defendants violated California statutory law, but the
court disagreed. It stated that the equal protection provision of the California constitution did
not require a finding of purposeful segregative intent. Rather, it is a settled rule under Califor-
nia case law that there is an affirmative constitutional duty to eradicate segregation in the
California public schools. In the court's opinion, the EMR placement process violated that duty.
Id. at 97(a) n.ll0.
45. See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
46. See note 20 supra.
47, It remains unclear whether a showing of racial discrimination under Title VI requires a
demonstration of purposeful segregative intent or merely a showing of disproportionate racial
impact. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Guadalupe Org., Inc.
v. Tempe Elementary School, 587 F.2d 1022, 1026 n.2 (1978); Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791
(9th Cir. 1973).
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• The starting point for the court's analysis was the rule of law anticipated
by Keyes v. School District No. 1,48 and later pronounced by the United
States Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis,49 that disproportionate im-
pact is not enough to compel strict judicial scrutiny 50 of a racial classifica-
tion. Rather, purposeful discriminatory intent must be demonstrated. 51
While a showing of disproportionate impact by statistical evidence may give
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, 52  ultimately the plaintiff
must prove segregative intent. 53 Of course, it is not necessary to prove
48. 413 U.S. 189 (1973) The Keyes Court held that "plaintiffs must prove not only that
segregated schooling exists but also that it was brought about by or maintained by intentional
state action." Id. at 198.
49. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In the Court's words:
[We] have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within
the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. Dis-
proportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidi-
ous racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not
trigger the rule ... that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.
Id. at 242. The alleged discriminatory practice in Washington was the use of a pre-employment
test by the District of Columbia Police Department that excluded a much higher percentage of
black than white candidates. Id. at 232-33.
50. The Supreme Court has exercised strict scrutiny when analyzing certain fundamental
rights (e.g., the right to vote) or suspect classifications (e.g., race). Under this test, courts
inquire whether the alleged discriminatory practice is necessary to effectuate a compelling state
interest. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000 (1978).
51. 426 U.S. at 242. One rationale for this rule is certainty of legislation:
Were the existence of a disproportionate impact alone sufficient to confer on the
courts the task of weighing the importance of governmental interests (and the effi-
cacy of particular classifications in furthering those interests), legislatures and other
governmental bodies would be unable to act conclusively whenever it was foresee-
able, or even conceivable, that a choice might have a greater-than-average adverse
effect on a "protected" group.
Note, Discriminatory Impact: An Assessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1384
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Disproportionate Impact].
52. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. The Court stated: "Necessarily, an invidious
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including
the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another." Id. Yet, in
Washington the Supreme Court was unable to infer the requisite intent in the administration of
an employment test "simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail[ed] to qualify than
members of other racial or ethnic groups." Id. at 245. It is important to note that in Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977), the Court warned that
the extreme disproportionate impact that would constitute prima facie proof of purposeful dis-
crimination is rare.
53. Generally courts have followed Justice Steven's understanding of the "objective" nature
of discriminatory purpose:
Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of
what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind
of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural con-
sequences of his deeds. This is particularly true in the case of governmental action
which is frequently the product of compromise, of collective decisionmaking, and of
mixed motivation. It is unrealistic, on the one hand, to require the victim of alleged
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1193
that the sole motive for the discriminatory conduct is segregative intent.
Thus, the problem is to determine what constitutes purposeful segregative
intent.54 This is necessarily true because legislative decisions are the result
of collective actions, and consequently are rarely, if ever, motivated by a
single concern. 55
Following precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, 56 Larry P. rejected the analysis employed by the court in
Lora v. Board of Education57 and most other circuits. 58 Under the Lora
analysis, the institution charged with discrimination is presumed to intend
the foreseeable consequences of its actions. 59 Recognizing that the Supreme
discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of the decisionmaker or, con-
versely, to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply because an improper mo-
tive affected the deliberation of a participant in the decisional process. A law con-
scripting clerics should not be validated because an atheist voted for it.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 253.
54. For a discussion of this issue, see generally Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and
Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 36 (1977); Perry, Mod-
ern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979);
Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in
Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961.
55. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
56. Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974); Soria v. Oxnard
School Dist., 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973).
57. 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
58. See Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), affd 443 U.S. 449
(1979); Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 142-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978);
United States v. Board of Schools Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824
(1978); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997
(1977); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated
and remanded sub nom. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 429 U.S. 990 (1977), petition for
rehearing denied, 579 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979);
United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded,
433 U.S. 667 (1977), prior judgment reinstated per curiam, 565 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1977) (en
bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1977). Cf. Richardson v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Health, 561
F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1977).
59. 456 F. Supp. at 1283-85. "The eyes of authorities are sufficiently evil, if they could and
should have foreseen the racially discriminatory import of their actions." Id. at 1285. Citing the
Second Circuit's opinion in Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1978), the Lora court
clarified the rationale for its foreseeability analysis:
In adopting this approach, we focused not on the mental process of a changing
group of school board members, but rather on the actions taken by the board itself.
When such actions have the "natural, probable and foreseeable result of increasing
or perpetuating segregation," a presumption of segregative purpose is created. The
burden of proof then shifts to defendant officials to show that the pattern of actions
taken by those officials can be explained in a manner consistent with the absence of
segregative intent. Put differently, once the burden of proof has shifted, school
officials must be able to demonstrate that no reasonable alternative policy would
have achieved the same permissible educational goals with less segregative effect.
When such a showing cannot be made, it is entirely reasonable to infer that the
officials acted with unlawful segregative intent.
456 F. Supp. at 1283-84 (emphasis added) (quoting Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 142 (2d
Cir. 1978)).
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Court has not accepted this presumption analysis, judge Peckham looked to
the factors outlined in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.60 to determine the existence of purposeful segregative
intent: the discriminatory effect of the school district's and state's actions,
the history of the charged behavior and the reasons for it, the specific se-
quence of actions being challenged, deviations from normal procedural se-
quence, legislative or administrative history, and statements of the school
officials involved. 6 '
Applying the Arlington Heights factors to the facts of Larry P., the court
had no difficulty agreeing with the plaintiffs that the biased IQ tests had the
tremendously discriminatory effect of placing a significantly disproportionate
number of black children in EMR classes.6 2 Then, in analyzing the second
factor-a history of discrimination-the court returned to the earliest de-
cades of this century to find discriminatory taint. 63
While the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have endorsed this test, see cases cited
in note 58 supra, the United States Supreme Court has not. In Personnel Administrator of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), a case dealing with the over-representation of men in the
state civil service, the Supreme Court rejected this standard: "'Discriminatory purpose ... im-
plies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences." Id. at 279. Although
awareness of the consequences of its aczions supports an inference of intent on the part of the
institution, "an inference is a working tool not a synonym for proof." Id. at 279 n.25. See also
Columbus lid. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (rejecting foreseeability analysis under
equal protection clause in school desegregation case); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443
U.S. 526 (1979) (same); notes 81-93 and accompanying text infra. Cf. Perry, Modern Equal
Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1038 (1979) (advocat-
ing foreseeable consequences test) [hereinafter cited as Perry].
60. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, the plaintiffs attacked zoning ordinances and
a refusal to permit a variance that prevented the building of low cost housing in a municipality.
Id. at 254. To demonstrate lack of purposeful segregation, the defendants proffered such pur-
poses as protecting property values and maintaining a policy of allowing the construction of
apartment buildings only in "buffer" zones between commercial and residential areas. Id. at
258. The Court found that the ordinances did have a disproportionate impact on racial
minorities, but could not find the discriminatory purpose required by Washington. Id. at 269-
70.
61. Id. at 266-68. The Arlington Heights Court also outlined a structure of judicial inquiry
in equal protection cases in which there is an allegation of a disproportionate racial impact: (1)
plaintiffs must establish that the promulgators of the challenged action were "motivated in part
by a racially discriminatory purpose"; (2) defendants must rebut by showing that the challenged
action would have resulted even without the discriminatory purpose; (3) if defendants cannot
make this showing, the action is found to be unlawful discriminatory, unless they can dem-
onstrate that the discrimination is not invidious, i.e., based on the inferiority of the class who
is the object of discrimination. Id. at 270-71 n.21. See Perry, supra note 59, at 1037 n.70.
62. No. C-71-2270 at 85.
63. Id. at 86. An astute psychologist might direct Judge Peckham to Hammurabi's Code and
its "eye for an eye" ethic, to feudal combats, or to witch trials to cast aspersions on the origins
of legal practice. Any discipline could be faulted for the ill-considered notions of its early
forefathers. Certainly the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights did not intend justices to delve
into ancient history to find discriminatory purpose. To fault the respective San Francisco and
California Boards of Education for actions between the World Wars, as Judge Peckham did, is
to impute to them the sin of Adam. As the Supreme Court in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
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But perhaps the most important factor, the one that formed the basis of
the Larry P. court's holding for the plaintiffs, was the irregularity of the
events preceding the requirement that certain basic tests be used in the
placement of children in EMR classes. The court found that the Board never
considered the question of test bias, basing its choice of tests solely on the
frequency of their use at the time. The Board neither held hearings on the
propriety of the tests nor investigated the opinions of minority testing ex-
perts. 64 Although the legislature had called the Board's attention to the
problem by a legislative resolution, 65 the Board failed to respond. The court
thus concluded that the inference of purposeful segregative intent was ines-
capable. 66
Finally, with respect to the last factor, the school officials damned them-
selves. In testifying, several "key" officials of the state Department of Educa-
tion revealed their belief that there was actually a higher incidence of mental
retardation among minority children than among white children.6 7
Moreover, the Board's failure to address problems raised by critics of the
tests on the mandatory list was further evidence of its lack of interest in the
disproportionate enrollments. 68
Thus, finding plaintiffs' evidence showed purposeful segregative intent
under the Arlington Heights factors, the court imposed the strict scrutiny
standard of judicial review.6 9 Under strict scrutiny, the defendants were
required to demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify their use of
biased tests in the EMR placement process. Offering such interests as the
need to prevent misclassification, the lack of alternatives to IQ tests as objec-
tive measures of intelligence and the need for fiscal control, the Board could
not convince the court that these interests were compelling. 70 In fact, the
court suggested the Board had itself shown the lack of a compelling in-
terest by voluntarily agreeing to eliminate EMR placement disparities for
Hispanic children. This concession left the Board with no excuses for its
behavior. 71
U.S. 189, 211 (1973), noted-reiterating the suggestion of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971)-"the relationship between past segregative acts and present
segregation may become so attenuated as to be incapable of supporting a finding of [purposeful]
segregation warranting judicial intervention."
64. No. C-71-2270 at 86-87. It would appear to be much more reasonable to attribute the
Board's failure to check the validity of the IQ tests on the required list to the omnipresent
conservatism and inertia inherent in almost all school boards and institutions, rather than to bad
faith and wilful segregative intent. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 418 (D.D.C.
1967) (explanation of the District of Columbia's decision not to abandon neighborhood schools
that obviously did not promote the mixing of the races).
65. CAL. H.R. RES. 444, 1969 Reg. Sess., 1969 Assembly Journal 7647-48.
66. No. C-71-2270 at 86-87.
67. Id. at 88.
68. Id. at 89-92.
69. Id. at 94.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 71.
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Having found segregative intent present and strict scrutiny therefore ap-
propriate, the Larry P. court concluded its analysis by asserting that defen-
dants could not prevail even if intermediate scrutiny were applied. 72  Ber-
kelman v. San Francisco Unified School District,73 a case predating
Washington, formed the framework for that analysis. 74 In Berkelman, the
court had applied intermediate scrutiny in an equal protection analysis of a
school district's practices governing admission to a preferred academic high
school. These practices resulted in the admission of a disproportionately
small number of black, Spanish American and low-income students; 75 how-
ever, the court found the admission standard, past academic achievement,
not to be unlawful because "the challenged classification further[ed] the
central purpose of the classifier." 76 In essence, the test set forth by Ber-
kelman asks whether the school's action provided the best possible education
for the students in the district. 77 The court believed that it had a duty to
apply this test regardless of whether it could find intent to discriminate.
Under Berkelman's interpretation of intermediate scrutiny, therefore, chal-
lenged practices may be found discriminatory without a showing of segrega-
tive intent.78
Applying the Berkelman test to Larry P.'s facts, the court concluded that
the special education placement procedures did not permit the San Fran-
cisco Unified School District to provide the best possible education because
they fostered injustices against black children. 79 Thus, the court held that
the school district's placement procedures for special education were not
closely related to achieving the state's objective of providing the best possi-
ble education, and hence violated the equal protection clause.
72. Id. at 96. Intermediate scrutiny is used frequently in assessing discrimination based on
gender or illegitimacy classifications. Essentially, it requires that the objectives served by the
classification, if not compelling, must be sufficiently important to merit its use, and that there
must be a substantial relation between the classification and the achievement of the sought
objective. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1082-83 (1978); Emden,
Intermediate Tier Analysis of Sex Discrimination Cases: Legal Perpetuation of Traditional
Myths, 43 ALB. L. REV. 73 (1978); Note, Alimony Awards Under Middle-Tier Equal Protection
Scrutiny, 57 NEB. L. REv. 172 (1980); Note, Equal Protection and The Middle-Tier: The Impact
On Women And Illegitimates, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 303 (1978); Note, O'Neil v. Baine: Appli-
cation of Middle-Level Scrutiny to Old-Age Classifications, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1979).
73. 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974).
74. See No. C-71-2270 at 96.
75. 501 F.2d at 1265-67.
76. Id. at 1268. The court distinguished the practice under review from tracking cases in
that the students who were not admitted would suffer little psychic injury or stigma, and would
not be relegated to an inferior learning situation. Id.
77. Id. at 1267.
78. Id.
79. No. C-71-2270 at 97.
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CRITIQUE
On the basis of Berkelman, the Larry P. court pronounced the following
legal conclusion:
[P]laintiffs have shown that defendants' tolerance of the disproportionate
enrollment of black children into EMR classes and their use of placement
mechanisms including I.Q. tests, which perpetuate that condition, violate
state and federal guarantees of a right to equal protection under the laws.
These findings do not depend on a finding of intentional discrimination. 80
In short, Larry P. stands for the proposition that intentional discrimination
need not be shown to demonstrate a violation of the equal protection clause
when racial discrimination is charged against public schools in their place-
ment procedures. Thus, according to Larry P., any unintended action which
has a discriminatory effect may violate the equal protection clause.
This holding directly contradicts relevant Supreme Court precedent. In a
recent intermediate scrutiny case, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney,81 the Court expressly held that purposeful discrimination is an
essential element in finding an equal protection violation. The issue in
Feeney was whether a Massachusetts statute giving preference to veterans
for government jobs violated the equal protection clause. Because few
women are veterans, and consequently few women are eligible for the veter-
ans preference, it was clear that the statute had a significant disproportion-
ate impact upon women.8 2 The Court applied a two question equal protec-
tion analysis, asking: Is the statutory classification in fact neutral, and if so,
does the adverse discriminatory effect reflect invidious purposeful discrimi-
nation? 83 Finding that the classification was neutral and that the Mas-
sachusetts legislature did not have a discriminatory purpose in enacting the
statute, the Court upheld the statute.84 The conclusion is inescapable that
the holding of Berkelman ss that intent is not an element of equal protection
violation when intermediate scrutiny is applied, if ever in accord with Su-
preme Court decisions, was overruled by Feeney.
Other recent Supreme Court decisions have reinforced the untent re-
quirement. In Columbus Board of Education v. Penick"8 and Dayton Board
of Education v. Brinkman,8 7 the Court held that both the Columbus and
80. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
81. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
82. 415 F. Supp. 4585, 498-99 (D. Mass. 1976).
83. 442 U.S. at 279.
84. Id. at 276. See The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REV. 135-41 (1979) (dis-
cussing Feeney's interpretation of the discriminatory purpose requirement of Washington). A
commentator stated therein: "The majority's analysis in Feeney demonstrates the Court's con-
tinuing commitment to a stiff discriminatory purpose requirement." Id. at 138. See also Dispro-
portionate Impact, supra note 51, at 1376.
85. 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974).
86. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
87. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
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Dayton school systems had not performed their affirmative duties to de-
segregate their "dual" school systems which had existed since the 1954 deci-
sion of Brown v. Board of Education.8 8 Finding that pre-Brown segregated
school systems were established by design, the Columbus Court concluded
that the school officials' failure to satisfy their affirmative duties was evidence
of purposeful segregative intent, a necessary element of equal protection vio-
lation. Significantly, the Court found that knowledge of a policy's predictable
effects on racial imbalance in a school system and continued adherence to
that policy are factors a court may consider in determining segregative in-
tent, but are not the equivalent of such.8 9
It is manifest that in analysing alleged equal protection violations, the
Washington v. Davis90 test remains the standard, the Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.91 factors are the mea-
sure, and Feeney has expressly adopted these cases as good precedent in the
area of intermediate scrutiny analyses. In none of these cases is there any
mention of the test espoused by the Ninth Circuit in Berkelman. Consonant
with precedent, courts deciding cases with allegations similar to those
presented in Larry P. must adopt the constitutional standard enunciated in
Washington, Arlington Heights and Feeney 92 -if, that is, such courts must
rule on these equal protection claims at all. 93 If, on the contrary, courts
were to hold, as in Larry P., that discriminatory intent need not be shown
to prove unlawful racial discrimination by educational administrators, such
courts would not only be ignoring the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution but also effectuating a policy which would make it all too easy
for courts to second guess educators' decisions.
THE ALTERNATIVE
Many of the problems in Larry P. could have been avoided had the court
been content to base its decision on federal statutory grounds; for procedural
reasons the court should have done just that. It is a deeply rooted practice
that courts should avoid addressing constitutional questions when other
grounds for decision exist.94
88. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
89. 443 U.S. at 464.
90. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See notes 49-54 and accompanying text supra.
91. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
92. It has even been stated that "the requirement of discriminatory purpose in constitutional
cases appears to have, as a general concept, the unanimous support of the Court." Dispropor-
tionate Impact, supra note 51, at 1380 n.27.
93. The Supreme Court recently reiterated a long standing rule of constitutional adjudica-
tion in an equal protection case:
If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of con-
stitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutional-
ity ...unless such adjudication is unavoidable. Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin,
323 U.S. 101, 105. Before deciding the consitutional question, it [is] incumbent ...
to consider whether the statutory grounds might be dispositive.
New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582 (1979).
94. See note 93 supra.
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In Larry P., Judge Peckham asserted that the relevant federal statutes were
not dispositive because the question remained unanswered whether they
required a showing of purposeful segregative intent.95 But, if, as argued
above, an equal protection claim requires proof of discriminatory intent, and
if it is assumed arguendo that the statutes require a showing of intent, then
the question of proof is essentially identical. The burden of proof would have
been no more severe under the equal protection clause than under the stat-
utes. In both cases, the greater burden of proof would have to be met by
the plaintiff. An equal protection claim would add little to the analysis, while
it does allow plaintiffs to circumvent the administrative remedial channels
mandated by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. 9 6 Con-
versely, if the Larry P. court had decided that the pertinent federal statutes
only required a showing of discriminatory impact, the standard for determin-
ing such statutory issues would be considerably clearer and the need for
constitutional analysis eliminated. If Congress finds such interpretations ill-
founded, it could modify the standard through legislation.
As it now stands, however, because the Larry P. decision is based on
constitutional grounds, its value as precedent is relatively free from congres-
sional modification. The use of IQ tests to place black children in special
education classes is prohibited, and school systems are left in doubt as to
whether the administrative channels they have established to place children
in special education classes will be invalidated through litigation. Perhaps
when it hears the appeal in Larry P., 9 7 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit will recognize the pitfalls in the present path of special
education in California, and reject the district court's constitutional analysis
in order to clarify the statutory standards.
EDUCATIONAL IMPACT
The decision in Larry P. has direct impact on the thousands of school
systems across the United States that are required by the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act to maintain special education programs for hand-
icapped students in order to qualify for federal assistance. 98 Larry P. will
undoubtedly spawn significant changes in American education in the next
few years.
This decision offers a major challenge to a basic part of an assessment
battery used by psychologists. 99 Moreover, it has created a furor in the
95. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
96. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1405, 1406, 1411-1420 (1976).
97. Riles v. Larry P., No. 80-4027 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1980) (notice of appeal filed).
98. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412, 1413 (1976).
99. An assessment battery consists of a variety of instruments that are used to reliably mea-
sure a student's intellectual, social, emotional, physical, linguistic, and academic growth. See
also Condas, supra note 5, at 157 ("[ili: is hard for me to see the outcome of this case as
anything other than the total prohibition of use of a major professional tool-in that respect
alone the case may be a first-and a denial of one species of educational opportunity to children
based solely on their color").
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assessment process far beyond the evaluation of minorities for EMR place-
ment. 10 0 Because traditional clinical and extensively researched IQ tests
such as the Wechsler Intelligence Test for Children and the Stanford Binet
Intelligence Test were challenged, Larry P. may have a fatal impact on the
numerous less validated group IQ tests used by a multitude of school sys-
tems to measure overall ability of their students, both black and white. Al-
though the Larry P. court did indicate that school officials could give indi-
vidual IQ tests if they first obtained judicial approval, 101 it is not realistic to
expect schools to seek such approval. Because courts are inevitably back-
logged, such a process would result in considerable delay for a school system in
placing children into special education programs. More importantly, because
the court listed as discriminatory the most well known and standardized
measures available, there appear to be few, if any, readily acceptable alter-
natives to measure ability.
Clear substitutes are not available for standardized tests; thus, highly sub-
jective observation or behavioral measures may be implemented in lieu of
statistically verifiable data. 10 2 Subjective measures are more susceptible to
personal bias than standardized tests and can produce discrimination in
diagnosing a handicap as well as in determining its severity. Ultimately,
Larry P. may be a Pyrrhic victory.
The Larry P. decision will also have impact on those black children who
legitimately are mildly to moderately mentally retarded and who may not
receive special programming in the absence of complete evaluation methods.
With the concern over possible misclassification of black children, many
specialists and teachers will be unwilling to place children in EMR
classes. 10 3 Yet, according to federal guidelines, these youngsters do not fit other
special education classifications.1 0 4 Thus, some of the benefits of special
100. See Prasse, Reactions to the Larry P. Decision, 8 NAT'L A. OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGISTS
COMMUNIQUE 3 (Jan.-Feb. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Prasse].
101. No. C-71-2270 at 104.
102. Carol Wade (M.S. Ed. Psych.), a school psychologist who has provided invaluable assist-
ance in the writing of this Note, suggests that there are several relatively new versions of
adaptive behavior measures available, such as the Adaptive Behavior Inventory for Children and
the AAMD Adaptive Behavior Scale-Public School Version. One problem with these tests is,
however, a low correlation of rater reliability (i.e., scores from different testers do not agree) as
well as low predictability over time, suggesting that these measures are both subjective and of
questionable value to predict future behavior. McCullough, Behavior Rating Scales: Contexts
and Criticisms, 8 NAT'L. A. OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGISTS COMMUNIQUE 6 (Nov. 1979). Moreover,
most adaptive behavior scales available were developed in and for institutional populations.
Kicklighter, Bailey & Richmond, A Direct Measure of Adaptive Behavior, 9 SCH. PSYCH. REV.
169 (1980).
103. Lambert, supra note 28, at 5-7.
104. The federal guidelines indicate the term "handicapped children" means "mentally re-
tarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally dis-
turbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired children, or children with specific
learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require special education and related services."
Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C § 1401.1 (1976). These handicapping
conditions are defined regardless of race. Moreover, the term "children with specific learning
disabilities" means
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education classes, for example, smaller classes, more teacher assistance, and
special teaching methods, may be denied these youngsters; they will remain
in regular classrooms where they first experienced problems.
Moreover, schools and states must now be concerned with the dispropor-
tionate placement of black students in other types of special education
classes, as well as in EMR classes.' 05 Although Larry P. considered only the
EMR class, it is nevertheless apparent that a challenge to disproportionate
numbers could also arise regarding other special education categories, espe-
cially those with somewhat negative labels, such as "behavior disorder."
Finally, the court's decision to limit assessment tools has significant impact
on the definition of special education categories (in this case, EMR) and,
hence, in the programming of handicapping conditions. This, in turn, will
affect teachers, social workers, psychologists, occupational therapists, and
speech therapists who work with handicapped children at all levels. 106 In
reality, assessment is closely associated with the definition of the handicap-
ping condition as well as with its programmed remedy. Larry P.'s reference
to EMR classes as "dead-end" placements certainly sets a negative tone, one
not substantiated by opinions of education professionals. 10 7 Alert educators
and legislators need to be concerned about the quality of such programs as
well as the frequency of review available to each individual child. 10 8
those children who have a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological pro-
cesses involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which
disorder may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think speak, read, write,
spell, or do mathematical calculations .... Such term does not include children
who have learning problems which are primarily the result of visual, hearing, or
motor handicaps, or mental retardaiion, of emotional disturbance, or environmen-
tal, cultural or economic disadvantage.
Id. at § 1411 (emphasis added). Thus, black children who are developing or achieving at a
slower rate may not qualify for other special education programs under the federal guidelines.
Furthermore, until the question of testing is settled-and it may take years to develop and
standardize new measures which are non-biased-many black children who might have benefit-
ted from special education programming will remain in the regular classroom without special
education help.
105. Lambert, supra note 28, at 4. MacMillan and Meyers make an even stronger assertion:
"The denial of needed services to children who fail seriously over a period of time (regardless
of the presence or absence of IQ information on these children) constitutes bad educational
practice and is a violation of PL 94-142 [Education for All Handicapped Children Act]; to do so
because a child is black constitutes racism." MacMillan & Meyers, Larry P.: An Educational
Interpretation, 9 ScH. PsYcH. REV, 136, 143 (1980) [hereinafter cited as An Educational Inter-
pretation].
106. Prasse, supra note 100, at 3.
107. An Educational Interpretation, supra note 105, at 141. Moreover, the concept of
mainstreaming which was lauded by the Larry P. and by the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act has come under attack by several studies which indicate that the social adjustment
and educational achievement levels of EMR students are not improved by regular class place-
ment. Id. at 142.
108. Furthermore, a determination of the guidelines for quality in the Individual Educational
Plan, a unique plan for each child's educational program, should be developed at the federal
level to insure programs that are challenging and appropriate to each child's development. Pre-
sently, an IEP must include:
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LEGAL IMPACT
While the repercussions of Larry P. will shake educational systems
throughout the country for some time to come, its effect on the legal profes-
sion also will be considerable. The case should engender a great deal of
litigation as parents of special education children find attorneys to advocate
the civil rights of their children. 10 9
One major well spring of litigation in the decision is the court's procedural
finding that the exhaustive remedies provided in the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act need not be pursued before an individual action
can be brought. 110 An impartial hearing procedure that includes an appeal
to the State Board of Education is mandated in the Education for All Hand-
icapped Children Act."' This avenue was necessarily pursued when parents
disagreed with special education placement. 112 Now, however, at least in
this case, the individual did not need to first proceed through mandated
hearing procedures before bringing a court action, implying that the tre-
mendous time and expense spent in administrative hearing procedures to
produce resolutions will be afforded little recognition by the courts.
Moreover, student placement decisions will be made increasingly less often
by educational professionals and increasingly more frequently by judicial or-
der.11 3
A second incentive for litigation is the lesser burden of proof adopted by
Larry P. 114 If Judge Peckham's conclusion of law, that a violation of the
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) a
statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C) a state-
ment of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the
extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational pro-
grams, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services,
and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for
determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being
achieved.
Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401.19 (1976).
109. In a similar Chicago case, a federal district court commented upon its view of Judge
Peckham's decision in Larry P: "[Tihe witnesses and the arguments which persuaded Judge
Peckham have not persuaded me. Moreover, I believe the issue in the case cannot properly be
analysed without a detailed examination of the items on the tests. It is clear that this was not
undertaken in the Larry P. case." Parents in Action on Special Education v. Chicago Bd. of
Educ., No. 79-C-3586 at 115 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 1980). See note 1 supra.
110. No. C-71-2270 at 52. See note 43 supra. It is interesting to note, however, the wording
of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act regarding a civil action. Briefly, the Act
states that a decision made in a due process hearing shall be final except that a party may bring
a civil action if "aggrieved by the findings and decision" of the hearing procedure. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1416(e)(2) (1976). Thus, it appears that this Act, unlike Section 504 or Title VI, has well
established guidelines for exhaustive remedies which should be used before civil action is com-
menced.
111. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1405, 1406, 1411-1420 (1976).
112. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act provides that parents or guardians
have the right to an impartial due process hearing if they disagree with special education ad-
ministrative decisions. These hearings are conducted by the local educational agency and may
be appealed to the state educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)-(c) (1976).
113. See note 43 supra.
114. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
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equal protection clause need not rest on a finding of intentional discrimina-
tion, is not reversed, then plaintiffs can avoid the onerous task of showing
purposeful segregative intent. Di;criminatory effect may be shown by simple
numbers, 1 15 while presenting evidence that reveals school officials' inten-
tions requires costly and time consuming discovery. Thus, an attorney's res-
ervation with bringing an action should be abated, and concerned individu-
als may be prompted to litigate more cases.
CONCLUSION
There are, no doubt, cases in which the civil rights of minority students
have been violated and these cases require judicial attention. On the other
hand, it cannot be denied that some courts have been all too willing to judge
zealously the ubiquitous allegations of discrimination in our schools. In
time, perhaps, federal judges will come to realize that public education is
not an appropriate hunting ground for dragons, monsters, and other
chimeras. In the decade of the seventies, courts have entered areas where
St. George would have feared to tread. In rendering their decisions, they
universally issue disclaimers that they have entered dark, entangled forests
of social arguments and issues from which they wish to escape. 1 1 6 Since
Congress appears so cowardly, however, courts feel compelled to go for-
ward. Perhaps a tempering of this impetuosity and a greater regard for con-
gressional caution can save American education from being deprived of im-
portant assessment tools, such as IQ tests, and from being assailed from all
sides by those who want more from it than it may be able to provide.
Daniel L. Wade
115. For the Supreme Court's use of statistical evidence as probative of purposeful discrimi-
nation, see Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 270 (1979); Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976).
116. For example, in Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), Judge Wright
offered these parting words of regret:
It is regrettable, of course, that in deciding this case this court must act in an
area so alien to its expertise. It would be far better indeed for these great social and
political problems to be resolved in the political arena by other branches of gov-
ernment. But these are social and political problems which seem at times to defy
such resolution. In such situations, under our system, the judiciary must bear a
hand and accept its responsibility to assist in the solution where constitutional rights
hang in the balance. So it was in Brown v. Board of Education, Bolling v. Sharpe,
and Baker v. Carr. So it is in the South where federal courts are making grave
attempts to implement the mandate of Brown. So it is here.
269 F. Supp. at 517 (emphasis added). See also No. C-71-2270 at 108.
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